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Plan of the Talk
Unfortunate Truths (as I see 
them)
Public Policy Principles for 
Finance in Long-term 
Transitions
Proposal:  Buyouts with 
Rentbacks
We are buying time, not crafting 
permanent solutions
 Buying time will be effective for a while
 At some point (with great uncertainty, 30 -250 
years) it won’t – coastal property will become an 
uninsurable risk
 The resulting outmigration will be different than what 
we’ve seen before
 More people, more value in the built 
environment
 Bigger environmental problems from 
abandonment
 Much better foresight about what is coming 
down the pike (Thanks a lot, Science!)
Individuals and businesses 
will make the final choices
 Some will leave next year, some will choose to 
wash away with their homes – but most will be 
somewhere in between
 Choices will depend on myriad social and 
individual factors
 Retreat is highly unlikely to take place in a way 
directly dictated by policy of planning
 But both public policies and market signals will 
play critical roles for those choices
The transition is critical!
 Ability to retain social and cultural capital
 Economic costs – magnitude of built assets 
stranded
 Adjustments to local government finance  
and services
 Environmental and economic costs of 
damage caused by abandoned capital
 How painful and dangerous it will be for 
people to relocate  (all at once is probably 
bad)
Risk reduction investments can 
set counter-productive 
expectations
 Reducing the risks and costs of living at the coast 
gives market signals that increase investment in 
the built environment
 Which in turn increase the economic and 
political case for the next round of public 
investments
 Which can lead to a longer timeline and a more 
disruptive and expensive transition
Example: Beach Nourishment –
Property Value Feedback
Principle: Make the market 
tell the truth
 Don’t subsidize individual risk reduction
 Local infrastructure should be financed 
locally
 Don’t subsidize insurance
 Recognize that this is both technically and 
politically difficult
Principle: Neutral Transfers and 
Aid
 Resources will (and IMHO should) be 
transferred to both specific demographic 
groups and communities
 Those resources should not be biased 
toward maintaining or returning to the status 
quo
 And could favor options that improve 
relocation outcomes (e.g. buyouts)
Priniciple: Adaptive Engineering 
and Clear Signals
 Tying future engineering to observable 
phenomena (like sea level rise) offers real 
advantage in guiding expectations and 
decisions
 Analogous to parametric bonds or crop 
insurance design, but with longer timelines
 Huge problem here is the ability to make 
credible political commitments
Principle: “A Crisis is a Terrible 
Thing to Waste”
 Storms and floods that cause extensive 
property damage disrupt the costs and 
benefits of discontinuous change
 Human nature and policy history have 
always biased response toward “we are not 
giving in to nature – we’re rebuilding”
 Changing the conversation and 
expectations about disaster response – and 
resilience -- to consider relocation and other 
responses is desirable
Resulting Issues for Finance 
Decisions in the Longer Run
1. When is investing in (buying) time no longer worth the 
cost?
2. The specifics of major transition matter a lot
 Gradual vs. sudden
 Value of lost capital
 Social disruption
3. Using public resources to reduce short term impacts 
could have negative unintended effects on transition 
dynamics
Policy Proposal: Buyouts with 
Rentbacks (BWR)
 What’s the proposal
 What problems does it (potentially) solve or 
ameliorate
 Drawbacks and challenges
 Next steps
Policy Outline
Public or regulated private entity buy 
properties (with partial public 
funding)
Rents back to seller, who can choose 
to live there for some period of time
At some point
Rental agreement ends
Property is retired
Remediation / Salvage occurs
Policy Outline
Where does the money come from, and 
what is the price
Future rent receipts
Pdv of rents less expenses
Current FEMA policies require 
destruction of structures 
This is a different context than 
repetitive-loss flooding
Happens earlier in the risk path
Designed around community 
transition, not individual properties
Policy Outline
Where does the money come from, and 
what is the price
 sources of compensation for coastal residents
Buyout funds
Resources for climate-proofing individual 
properties
Resources for risk reduction at community 
and  regional levels
Protecting property
Protecting infrastructure
 Potential savings from remediation after 
abandonment
Determining price!?
 Present discounted value of rents less expenses
 Other sources
 Transfers
 Could minimize upfront financial cost by giving “free” rent
 Influenced by real estate market fundamentals
 Existing buyouts generally occur when property has been 
(repeatedly) damaged by climate events
 Existing policies largely buy out at some version of pre-
disaster market value for an undamaged property
 This policy requires a different model
Policy Outline
 Residents (whether owners or current renters) 
continue to reside in their property if they wish 
to
 They can leave at any time (with normal 
notice)
 Rules and decisions for when the property is 
no longer rented
Policy Outline
Who owns the houses after buyout
Local government (public housing 
model)
Private investors
Who manages properties after buyout
Local government
Contracts with management companies
Mixed models
When does it start?
 Earlier in the risk calculation than existing 
buyout programs
 Start determined in conjunction with 
when the program ends
 Determined by some combination of 
observable climate signals, modeling, 
and experience
When does it end?
Some combination of
When original tenant leaves
When house is damaged to some specified 
level
When some observable climate signal (or risk 
mitigation signal)  is observed
Advantages
 Buyouts generally have advantages
Neutral resource transfers
Achieve equity and social goals
Remove at-risk properties from future disaster-
related expenditures
And adding “rentbacks” makes the policy 
(arguably) more financially and politically feasible
Adding rentbacks has other significant advantages 
not related to just making buyouts more feasible 
and likely
Policy Advantages: buyouts are a 
mechanism for relatively neutral financial 
transfers
 Transferring resources without biasing recipients is 
challenging
 Historical means – post-disaster assistance, subsidies to 
engineering and infrastructure, insurance subsidies -- tend to 
be biased against relocation
 buyouts provide a means of transferring resources in a 
way that 
 Does not bias people toward staying
 Does not bias people toward all leaving at the same time
 buyouts could serve a mechanism for aggregating 
diverse sources of finance
Policy Advantages: transferring 
remediation responsibility
 Individual owners abandoning property are very 
unlikely to be financially and operationally responsible 
for remediation
 Performance bonds could ameliorate this
 Buyouts could price remediation into buyout pricing
 And economies of scale and timing could result in 
better remediation outcomes
 Buyouts add a longer time horizon and more 
predictable flow of properties to be abandoned, 
potentially enhancing efficiencies in 
remediation/salvage
BWR makes buyouts more 
feasible / probable
 Rental income provides an additional source of 
finance
 Flexibility in timing makes homeowners more likely to 
accept buyouts
 Moving the timeline forward from “everything is 
already trashed” makes buyouts generally more 
effective in managing transitions
BWR-specific advantage: breaking the public 
investment – private investment positive 
feedback
 If the same entity is making decisions 
about risk reduction and real estate 
maintenance/investment, then these 
decisions can be made jointly and  
the sequential, path-dependent 
spiral is interrupted.
Removes one source of uncertainty 
from relocation and reduces crash 
risk
BWR-specific advantage : separating 
financial decision/considerations from 
relocation decisions
 As real estate markets increasingly price in risk, resident 
owners may feel may trapped by loss of wealth and 
hope/expectation that things will improve
 Or may feel pressure to sell early to try to ”time the 
market” and leave early, resulting in possible crash / 
collapses
 Individual property owners are very likely to more risk-
averse and loss-averse than governments or pools of 
investment capital
BWR-specific advantage : separating 
financial decision/considerations from 
relocation decisions
 Decision points will increasingly come after climate 
events with
 “clumping” of relocation
 Financial hardship making successful relocation 
problematic
BWR allows residents to separate the wealth decision 
(and fear of loss) from the relocation decision
BWR-specific advantage: Smoothing 
demographic and local finance 
change
 Lessen sudden (post-storm and/or real-estate-
collapse) spikes in relocation
 Allows both short-term and residential rentals (to 
support tourism)
 Rentals will either stand in for (public ownership) or 
provide (private ownership) property tax receipts in a 
relatively predictable path toward demographic and 
service contraction
Drawbacks/Challenges
 Inherent difficulties of public ownership 
of rental property (public housing)
 Policy and political difficulties of 
aggregating and financing diverse 
sources of buyout funds 
 Arbitrage / corrupt outcomes (lack of 
transparent pricing and accessible 
process)
 Holdouts (degree of coercion / 
application of eminent domain)
Next steps (if this idea has 
any value at all)
 Start to identify triggers for when buyouts should occur
 Explore feasibility of private investment as a means of 
implementation and rental management
 Explore how coastal populations might react to the 
idea, depending on 
 Timing
 Price
 Contract terms (rental price and parameters)
 Optics
 Other implementation parameters
Why consider policies like 
this one?
 If our analysis about the importance of transition from 
climate-proofing to relocation is correct
 Then
 lots of outcomes with very bad characteristics are 
possible
 Mass relocation on short time scales
 Significant loss of wealth and social capital
 Crashes with large capital losses
 This policy (or something with similar features) could 
ameliorate some of these very bad characteristics of 
mass relocations
